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MCCAULEY V. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.:
TREATMENT OF A MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
PENDING AN ARBITRABILITY APPEAL
INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is a method of dispute resolution "involving one or more
neutral third parties who are agreed to by the disputing parties and whose
decision is binding."' The arbitration proceeding is distinct from litiga-
tion and its underlying purpose is to "encourag[e] dispute resolution
without resort to the courts."2 Arbitration is an attractive form of dispute
resolution because it "leads to the efficient resolution of disputes without
resort to the time and expense of litigation."3
Although arbitration is an efficient form of dispute resolution, a
party cannot be forced to arbitrate in the absence of an arbitration agree-
ment.4 Generally, the parties, subject to such an agreement, will choose
to arbitrate on their own. However, when a party is resolute on trying to
avoid arbitration, "a federal district court may be required to ascertain
whether an arbitration clause contained in an agreement between or
among the involved parties requires that the dispute be submitted to arbi-
tration.",5 When a party to an arbitration agreement files a motion to
compel arbitration, the federal district court will determine whether to
grant or deny the motion.
When a motion to compel arbitration is granted, the parties are re-
quired to submit to arbitration to resolve their disputes. When the mo-
tion to compel arbitration is denied, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
permits the moving party to appeal. Several issues arise in this scenario.
How should the district court, which denied the motion to compel arbi-
tration, proceed? Should the district court grant a motion to stay the pro-
ceedings pending the arbitrability appeal? Or, should the district court
deny a motion to stay and proceed with the case on the merits?
The former is in line with the purpose of arbitration-to save time
and money by avoiding litigation, but the latter has favorable arguments
as well-namely to avoid frivolous appeals in an effort to stall the litiga-
tion process. When a district court denies a party's motion to compel
arbitration, circuits are divided on whether proceedings should be stayed
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 112 (8th ed. 2004).
2. 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 6 (2005).
3. James R. Foley, Recent Development: Bradford-Scott Data Corp., Inc. v. Physician Com-
puter Network, Inc., 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1071, 1071 (1998).
4. 19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 203.12 (3d ed. 2005).
5. See Foley, supra note 3, at 1071.
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during an appeal of that decision. Recently, the Tenth Circuit, in a case
of first impression, addressed this issue. In McCauley v. Halliburton
Energy Services Inc.,6 the Tenth Circuit adopted the approach of the Sev-
enth and Eleventh Circuits and held that a motion to stay proceedings in
the district court should be granted pending an arbitrability appeal.7
Part I of this article discusses the arbitration process; the Federal
Arbitration Act, the four-prong test for determining whether a court
should generally stay proceedings, the growing popularity of arbitration
in the United States, and the circuits' opposing views on whether to grant
a stay pending an arbitrability appeal. Part II of this article discusses the
recent Tenth Circuit case of McCauley v. Halliburton. Finally, Part III
presents two main arguments supporting the holding in McCauley. First,
procedurally, a stay should be granted because a district court lacks ju-
risdiction to continue with a case on the merits pending an arbitrability
appeal; and second, allowing for a stay is consistent with the FAA and
the purpose of arbitration generally. Finally, I address whether the issue
will likely reach the United States Supreme Court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Arbitration-Alternative Dispute Resolution
Arbitration is one of several alternative processes that parties can
use to resolve disputes. The main reason parties agree to arbitrate is to
avoid the time and expenses that often accompany the litigation process.
Furthermore, unlike litigation, arbitration is private, and thus appeals to
those wishing to keep their disputes out of the public eye. Arbitration
can be defined as a private process where one or more neutrals renders a
decision after hearing arguments and reviewing evidence. 8 Generally, in
arbitration, the neutral's decision is binding unless the parties contract in
such a way as to allow for an appeal of the decision.9 However, most
often arbitration is used as a binding dispute resolution procedure.
There are several steps in the arbitration process. First, the parties
generally agree to arbitrate in the event that a dispute arises. Parties usu-
ally do so by entering into an arbitration agreement. Once a dispute
arises there are six standard stages in the arbitration process.' 0
The first step in the arbitration process is the initiation--one party
will submit a "demand" or "notice" to the other party stating that, pursu-
ant to the parties' agreement, arbitration shall be used to settle a given
dispute.' If both parties agree to arbitrate, then the parties enter the sec-
6. 413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005).
7. McCauley, 413 F.3d at 1163.
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ond stage of the arbitration process, preparation, where the parties pre-
pare for the case.' 2 However, if one party refuses to arbitrate or honor
the arbitration agreement, the moving party may, pursuant to the Federal
Arbitration Act, file a motion to compel arbitration in any district court
with jurisdiction over the matter.' 3 If the motion is granted, the parties
are required to arbitrate and the second stage, preparation, begins. In the
preparation stage, the parties will prepare for the arbitration hearing.
14
This may include pre-hearing discovery if necessary. 5 However, if the
motion to compel arbitration is denied, the moving party may appeal the
denial of the motion to compel arbitration. 16
The third and forth stages of the arbitration process are the pre-
hearing conference and hearing.' 7 In the pre-hearing conference the par-
ties and the arbitrator deal with administrative tasks such as scheduling
the arbitration. 8 The hearing is an evidentiary-type hearing where both
parties present their evidence to the arbitrator.' 9
Finally, the fifth and sixth stages of the arbitration process are the
decision-making stage and the award stage. 0 Upon the completion of
the hearing, the arbitrator will decide the dispute. Often this is done im-
mediately upon completion of the hearing, but no more than thirty days
after the hearing.2' Once a decision is made, the arbitrator will render a
decision in the form of an award, which generally, unlike litigation, is
binding with no option for appeal.22
B. The Federal Arbitration Act
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act2 3 (FAA) "to
ensure that arbitration agreements would be given the same legal effect
as other contracts" 24 and "to assure those who desired arbitration and
whose contracts related to interstate commerce that their expectations
would not be undermined by federal judges, or . . . by the widespread
12. Id.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. Id.
15. Because one of the main qualities of arbitration is the expediency of the process, often
times pre-hearing discovery in arbitration is limited. The limitations of discovery are usually estab-
lished by the arbitrator, but nonetheless, discovery in arbitration is very rarely as extensive as the
discovery process in litigation. See COOLEY, supra note 8, at 30.







23. 9 U.S.C.S. § 1 - 16 (2005).
24. Thomas G. Stenson, Punitive Damages Under the Federal Arbitration Act: Have Arbitra-
tors'Remedial Powers Been Circumscribed by State Law, 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 661,
661 (1992).
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unwillingness of state courts to enforce arbitration agreements. 25 Fur-
thermore, following the enactment of the FAA the United States Su-
preme Court has required courts to "rigorously enforce" arbitration
agreements.26
Under Section 4 of the FAA, a party to an arbitration agreement
may petition any United States district court, with proper jurisdiction, for
an order to compel arbitration.27 When determining the arbitrability of a
dispute, the court must decide "whether the parties agreed to arbitrate
and, if so, whether the scope of that agreement encompasses the asserted
claims., 28  If the district court is satisfied that the dispute shall be re-
solved through arbitration, the court will order the parties to proceed to
arbitration.2 9 On the other hand, if the district court denies a party's Sec-
tion 4 motion to compel arbitration, Section 16(a) of the FAA allows for
an interlocutory appeal of the order denying arbitration.30 Allowing such
an appeal demonstrates the FAA's "liberal policy favoring arbitration.',
31
Specifically, the FAA, allowing such an appeal, supports the policy fa-
voring arbitration "by permitting interlocutory appeals of orders favoring
litigation over arbitration ... ,32 Conversely, the FAA does not allow
interlocutory appeals of orders favoring arbitration over litigation in the
presence of an arbitration agreement.33
25. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (citing Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v.
Terminal Constr. Corp., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961)).
26. Catherine Burnham, Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 767, 769 (2005) (quoting Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)).
27. The FAA states:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a
written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save
for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action or in admi-
ralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for
an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such
agreement.
9 U.S.C.S. § 4 (2005).
28. MOORE ET AL., supra note 4, § 203.12 (quoting Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. C.A.
Reaseguradora Nacional, 991 F.2d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1993)).
29. 9 U.S.C.S. § 4 (2005).
30. 9 U.S.C.S. § 16(a)(1)(C) (2005) (This section was enacted by Congress in 1988 and reads,
"An appeal may be taken from an order denying an application under section 206 of this title to
compel arbitration."). ,
31. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991) (quoting Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)).
32. MOORE ET AL., supra note 4, § 203.12 (quoting Forsythe Int'l S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of
Texas, 915 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1990)).
33. The rationale behind this idea goes directly to Congress' intent in enacting the FAA.
Congress desired courts to honor arbitration agreements and give then the same legal effect as other
contracts. Stenson, supra note 24, at 661. Allowing an appeal of an order favoring arbitration over
litigation, in the presence of an arbitration agreement, would undermine this purpose, as one must
assume that parties understand the implications of an arbitration agreement if they willingly form a
contract which includes such an agreement (of course, this statement is directed more towards com-
mercial contracts between parties of equal bargaining power rather than consumer contracts where
companies clearly have unequal bargaining power over consumers who, in most cases, do not choose
to enter arbitration agreements when they purchase a service or good).
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The FAA is explicit about courts enforcing valid arbitration agree-
ments, and equally explicit about allowing for an appeal of a district
court order denying a party's motion to compel arbitration. However,
the FAA does not instruct courts on whether a stay of proceedings in the
district court should be granted pending an arbitrability appeal,34 which
one can assume has led to the circuit split on this issue. Among the cir-
cuits that have addressed this issue, two dominant approaches and sup-
porting arguments have developed. The Second and Ninth Circuits re-
fuse to stay proceedings on the merits while the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits take the position that an automatic stay should be granted pend-
ing an arbitrability appeal.
C. Stay of Proceedings Generally: The Four Prong Test
Simply put, a stay postpones or halts court proceedings and judg-
ments. 35 If a motion to stay is granted, the district court postpones pro-
ceeding with the case. However, if the motion is denied, the moving
party may appeal. Section 3 of the FAA calls for the district court to
grant a stay of proceedings when a motion to compel arbitration is
granted and the parties are ordered to arbitrate.36 However, the FAA
does not expressly address whether a stay should be granted pending an
appeal of an arbitrability determination.
Traditionally, a four-prong test has been used to determine whether
a stay should be granted pending the appeal. In Hilton v. Braunskill,
37
the Supreme Court established a four-prong test for determining whether
a stay of proceedings should be granted pending an appeal.38 The four
factors are:
[W]hether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is
likely to succeed on the merits; whether the applicant will be irrepa-
rably injured absent a stay; whether issuance of the stay will substan-
tially injure the other parties interest in the proceeding; and where the
34. See Foley, supra note 3, at 1071 (citing C.B.S. Employees Fed. Credit Union v.
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 307, 309 (W.D. Tenn. 1989)).
35. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1453 (8th ed. 2004).
36. The FAA states:
If any suit of proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any is-
sue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in
which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit of
proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one
of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C.S. § 3 (2005).
37. 481 U.S. 770 (1987).
38. Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776.
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public interest lies.39 This four-prong test is applied widely through-
out the federal courts, and is not limited to issues of arbitrability.
40
However, the different circuits have applied the test in different ways by
favoring some factors over others.41  For example, some circuits give
more weight to the likelihood of success on the merits, and yet other cir-
cuits allow a strong showing on one factor to compensate a weak show-
ing on another factor.42
Although the four-prong test is widely used to determine whether a
stay of proceedings should be granted, the application of the four-prong
test in the context of arbitrability is being abandoned by some circuits.
Specifically, as discussed elsewhere,43 the Seventh and Eleventh circuits
have abandoned the four-prong test, and instead have held that an auto-
matic stay should be granted pending an arbitrability appeal.
D. The Growing Popularity ofArbitration as a Dispute Resolution Pro-
cedure
Recent data suggest that arbitration is becoming an increasingly
popular form of dispute resolution in the United States."n However, ac-
cording to a 2004 study conducted by the National Arbitration Forum,
very few people use post-dispute arbitration agreements to arbitrate,
leaving pre-dispute arbitration agreements as the only real avenue for
parties to gain access to arbitration. 45 This fact, coupled with the increas-
ing popularity of arbitration, suggests that more and more arbitration
agreements are being created and used. This is very important in the
context of how courts handle arbitrability issues. Below, data is pre-
sented on the public's general awareness and knowledge about the use of
arbitration; on the use of arbitration to resolve disputes arising from con-
sumer transactions; and on the use and benefits of arbitration for resolv-
ing commercial contract disputes.
1. General Awareness and Knowledge about the Use of Arbitration
Recent data indicates that the general awareness and knowledge
about the use of arbitration is increasing.46 As an update to a 1999 study,
data from the 2004 study conducted by the National Arbitration forum
suggests that Americans are increasingly finding arbitration to be a pre-
39. Id.
40. Foley, supra note 3, at 1076.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See infra Part I.F.
44. NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, THE CASE FOR PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS:
EFFECTIVE AND AFFORDABLE ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR CONSUMERS, EMPIRICAL STUDIES & SURVEY
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ferred method of dispute resolution over litigation.47 In 1999, 59% of
individuals surveyed stated that they would choose arbitration over liti-
gation in a lawsuit for monetary damages.48 In 2003, 64% of individuals
surveyed said they would choose arbitration. 9 While this is only a 5%
increase, the more astounding finding is that in 1999, 50% of individuals
surveyed felt it was worthwhile to initiate a lawsuit.5 ° In 2003, only 34%
felt initiating a lawsuit was worthwhile.5' Clearly, these figures suggest
that the general mindset concerning dispute resolution is heading away
from litigation in favor of arbitration.
2. The Use of Arbitration for Consumer Transaction Disputes
Generally speaking, consumers are increasingly favoring arbitration
for resolving consumer disputes. Although the data from the 2004 Na-
tional Arbitration Forum survey pertaining to arbitration and consumer
transactions focused on securities arbitration, it is nevertheless a telling
indicator for the trends concerning arbitration and consumer transaction
disputes. One reason why arbitration may be gaining popularity amongst
consumers is because the consumer win rate is greater in arbitration as
opposed to in court. Specifically, a 2002 report, by Professor Michael
Perino of St. John's University School of Law, contained within the 2004
National Arbitration Forum survey, states that the consumer win rate in
arbitration from 1980 to 2001 was 52.56% while the consumer win rate
in federal court in 2000 was only 32%.52 This suggests that consumers
enjoy a 20% greater win rate when they choose to resolve their disputes
using arbitration as opposed to litigation. This is a large percentile dif-
ference, and surly is enough to increase the attractiveness and popularity
of arbitration as a means of resolving consumer transaction disputes.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly for the credibility of arbi-
tration as a dispute resolution procedure, a study surveying responses of
investor-participants to the arbitration process found that 91% of respon-
dents stated that the arbitration process was handled fairly and without
bias. This is encouraging because a process must be credible and fair if
people are going to use it with confidence. At least from this data, arbi-




49. Id. at 10.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 8.
53. Id.
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3. The Use of Arbitration for Resolving Commercial Contract Dis-
putes
Finally, there is a trend that more companies are not only beginning
to use arbitration, but that using arbitration also has substantial benefits
for these companies. A study released in October 2003 by the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), which included interviews with 254 cor-
porate general counsel, associate general counsel, and the like from over
one hundred Fortune 1000 organizations, found that arbitration is becom-
ing increasingly popular for resolving commercial contract disputes.54
Of those interviewed, 85% reported using arbitration to resolve these
types of disputes. 55 Additionally, the study found that companies relying
on arbitration or mediation to resolve disputes were more successful at
"preserving business relationships" and keeping their costs down.56 With
this, respondents indicated that, because they approached dispute resolu-
tion from a broader risk and business management perspective, they were
"stretched to the limit" 20% less than those who were less focused on
preserving relationships while settling their disputes.57
E. The Second and Ninth Circuits
The Second and Ninth Circuits have both held that there should not
be a stay of proceedings on the merits while a motion to compel arbitra-
tion is pending. The following discusses the facts, procedural history,
and rationale from both.
1. The Second Circuit: Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan
58
In Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, the plaintiffs, Motorola Credit
Corporation (Motorola) and Nokia Corporation (Nokia) sued the defen-
dants, members of the Uzan family of Turkey and the companies the
family controls, Telsim and Rumeli Telefon.59 In 1998, Motorola lent
Telsim $360 million to purchase cellular infrastructure and equipment
from Motorola Ltd., and $200 million so Telsim could acquire a national
cellular license for Turkey. 60  In subsequent years, Motorola provided
more financing for Telsim eventually totaling roughly $2 billion.61 As
collateral for these loans Motorola received a substantial portion of Tel-
sim's outstanding shares.62 Throughout the time of this financing, Mo-
54. Press Release, American Arbitration Association, Groundbreaking Study Finds Compa-
nies that Use ADR to Manage Conflicts Excel in Controlling Costs, Preserving Relationships: Play-
ing to Win Can be a Losing Strategy, Data Indicates (Oct. 15, 2003), http://www.adr.org (follow




58. 388 F.3d 39, (2d Cir. 2004).
59. Motorola Credit Corp., 388 F.3d at 42-43.
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torola signed several agreements providing that the parties agree to arbi-
trate any dispute arising under the agreement in front of a three arbitrator
panel in Switzerland, in accordance with the laws of Switzerland.63
Motorola and Nokia brought suit against the defendants on various
claims including fraud. 64 Subsequently, the district court denied the de-
fendants motion to compel arbitration and refused to stay the proceedings
pending an appeal of the denial of the motion to compel arbitration.65
Ultimately, the plaintiffs received an award of nearly $4.2 billion dollars
in compensatory and punitive damages.66 The defendants appealed
claiming several errors, including that the district court erred in not
granting the motion to compel arbitration and that the district court was
without jurisdiction to proceed with the case on the merits while the ap-
peal of the denied motion to compel arbitration was pending.67
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the district court properly
denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration and that the district
court was not divested of jurisdiction to proceed on the merits while the
appeal to the denial of the motion to compel arbitration was pending.68
Ultimately, the court vacated the district court's award of punitive dam-
ages and remanded for a new calculation of punitive damages.69
2. The Ninth Circuit: Britton v. Co-op Banking Group
70
In Britton v. Co-op Banking Group, the plaintiffs alleged that Lie-
bling, among other defendants, participated in a "securities fraud scheme
by selling a fraudulent tax shelter investment.' The plaintiffs pur-
chased securities from defendants, Gold Depository and Loan Company,
a Co-op Banking Group company. 72 The contract of sale for these secu-
rities included an arbitration provision.73
After filing the original complaint, the plaintiffs subsequently filed
three amended complaints.74 During the time the plaintiffs continued to
amend their complaint, Liebling attempted to informally reach a settle-
ment with the plaintiffs.75 When settlement appeared unlikely, Liebling
contacted the plaintiffs and demanded arbitration pursuant to the arbitra-
tion provision in the contract of sale for the securities.76 The plaintiffs
63. Id.
64. Id. at 44.
65. Id. at 45.
66. Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 274 F. Supp, 2d 481, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
67. Motorola Credit Corp., 388 F.3d at 49.
68. Id. at 49.
69. Id. at 65-66.
70. 916 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1990).





76. Id. at 1407-08.
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refused to arbitrate, so Liebling filed a motion pursuant to the FAA 77
seeking to compel arbitration. 78 The district court denied Liebling's mo-
tion to compel arbitration reasoning that he waived his right to arbitration
by actively pursuing litigation. 79 Liebling appealed the denial of the mo-
tion to compel arbitration, and filed a motion to stay proceedings.8 0 The
district court denied Liebling's motion for a stay of proceedings pending
his appeal to the denial of the motion to compel arbitration.8 1 During the
time Liebling was seeking arbitration and subsequently a stay of the pro-
ceedings, the plaintiffs continually pushed for discovery.8 2 Liebling re-
sisted, which ultimately resulted in a default judgment entered against
Liebling.8 3 To this, Liebling argued that, because an appeal was filed,
the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter a default judgment against
him.84
3. Analysis-Second and Ninth Circuit Holdings
The Second and Ninth Circuits hold that a motion to stay proceed-
ings should not be granted pending an arbitrability appeal. In Motorola
Credit Corp., decided in 2004, the Second Circuit followed the Ninth
Circuit's rationale and holding in Britton, decided in 1990. Therefore,
the following analysis of the Second and Ninth Circuits holdings will
focus on the rationale of the Ninth Circuit in Britton.
Judge Fletcher, writing the Britton opinion, gave two main reasons
for refusing to stay proceedings while the arbitrability appeal was pend-
ing. First, Judge Fletcher explained the general rule, filing a notice of
appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction, does not apply to an arbi-
trability appeal because the issue of arbitrability is completely independ-
ent of the merits of the case. 5 In support of this contention, Judge
Fletcher quotes Moore 's Federal Practice, which states that "where an
appeal is taken from a judgment which does not finally determine the
entire action, the appeal does not prevent the district court from proceed-
ing with matters not involved in the appeal. 8 6 Therefore, the district
court retains jurisdiction, and the court may proceed with the merits of
the case. 7
The second reason Judge Fletcher provides for refusing to stay pro-
ceedings is that allowing an automatic stay pending an arbitrability ap-
77. 9 U.S.C.S. § 4 (2005).






84. Id. at 1411.
85. Id.
86. Britton, 916F.2dat 1411 (quoting MOOREETAL.,supra note 4, § 203.11)).
87. Britton, 916 F.2d at 1412.
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peal would "allow a defendant to stall a trial simply by bringing a frivo-
lous motion to compel arbitration.' '8 Based on these two reasons, the
Ninth Circuit in Britton held that a motion to stay proceedings should not
be granted pending an arbitrability appeal.8 9 Subsequently, for identical
reasons, the Second Circuit adopted the same holding. 90
F. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have both held that there should
be a stay of proceedings on the merits while a motion to compel arbitra-
tion is pending. The following discusses the facts, procedural history,
and rationale from both.
1. The Seventh Circuit: Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician
Computer Network, Inc. 91
In Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc.,
the plaintiff, Bradford-Scott Data Corp. (Bradford-Scott), entered into an
agreement to distribute computer software written by VERSYSS Incor-
porated.92 Bradford-Scott and VERSYSS entered into two contracts, the
Vertical Value-Added Reseller Agreement (VAR) and the Master Li-
cense Agreement. 93 The VAR agreement contained an arbitration clause,
covering "any dispute or controversy between the parties ... relating to
this Agreement." 94 The Master License Agreement had a narrower arbi-
tration clause covering only "payments dispute[s] concerning license or
support fees." '  Subsequent to entering into the software distribution
agreement and executing the VAR and Master License Agreements,
VERSYSS was acquired by Physician Computer Network (PCN), which
offered a software package competing with the VERSYSS software
Bradford-Scott licensed.
96
Shortly after PCN acquired VERSYSS, Bradford-Scott filed suit
against PCN and VERSYSS, claiming that VERSYSS violated its obli-
gations under the Master License Agreement due to the acquisition and
subsequent conduct of PCN and VERSYSS. 97 Ultimately, the district
court concluded that the dispute was not arbitrable.98 In response, PCN
and VERSYSS appealed the arbitrability determination under Section
16(a)(1)(A) of the FAA and requested a stay of proceedings pending the
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Motorola Credit Corp., 388 F.3d 39 at 54.
91. 128 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1997).
92. Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 504.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 505.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 504.
97. Id. at 505.
98. Id.
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appeal. 99 The district court refused to stay the proceedings. 100 However,
based on the reasons discussed in the analysis, 10' the Seventh Cicruit held
that a stay should be granted pending the arbitrability appeal.
2. The Eleventh Circuit: Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing
10 2
In Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, Jack and Deborah Blinco, in a
putative class action, claimed that Green Tree Servicing (Green Tree)
failed to give notification of a transfer of the servicing of their loan in
violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. 10 3 Since an arbi-
tration clause was included in the note executed by Jack Blinco, Green
Tree moved the district court to compel arbitration and to stay the litiga-
tion. 10 4 The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration and the
motion to stay.105 Pursuant to the FAA, 10 6 Green Tree appealed the de-
nial of the motion to compel arbitration.10 7 Upon Green Tree's appeal,
the district court refused to stay proceedings pending the appeal, which
resulted in Green Tree asking the Circuit Court for relief.'08 The district
court's rationale for denying the stay pending the arbitrability appeal was
that, although the appeal was not frivoulous, the district court did not
want "to set a precedent of placing cases on hold while defendants seek
interlocutory appeals of the court's order."' 09 The district court stated
that a delay of discovery and proceedings pertaining to class certification
was unnecessary, and further stated that a stay was unnecessary because
the appeal would be decided before trial."10 However, based on the rea-
sons discussed in the analysis,"' the Eleventh Circuit held that a stay
should be granted pending the arbitrability appeal.
3. Analysis-Seventh and Eleventh Circuit Holdings
On the issue of granting a stay of proceedings on the merits while
an appeal to a denied motion to compel arbitration is pending, the Sev-
enth and Eleventh Circuits held that the district court should not proceed
on the merits, and therefore grant motions to stay the proceedings. In
Blinco, a case decided in 2004, the Eleventh Circuit followed the ration-
ale and holding of the Seventh Circuit in Bradford-Scott, which was de-
cided in 1997. Thus, the analysis of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See infra Part 1.F.3.
102. 366 F.3d 1249 (1 lth Cir. 2004).
103. Blinco, 366 F.3d at 1250.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A) (2005).
107. Blinco, 366 F.3d at 1250.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1251.
111. See infra Part .F.3.
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holdings will focus on the rationale of the Seventh Circuit in Bradford-
Scott.
In Bradford-Scott, Judge Easterbrook, writing the opinion for the
court, began by stating the district court's reason for denying a stay
pending appeal of the arbitrability determination was "untenable."
'" 2
The lower court reasoned that the denial of the motion to compel arbitra-
tion was unappealable, and therefore held that a stay of the proceedings
pending appeal should not be granted."l 3 Judge Easterbrook responded
to the lower court's decision by making note of Section 16(a)(1)(A) of
the FAA, which expressly authorizes an appeal to a denied motion to
compel arbitration.' 4 After establishing that the appeal was proper un-
der the FAA, Judge Easterbrook continued by stating that the "appel-
lant's request would fail at the outset" if the four-prong test of Hilton v.
Braunskill' 15 was used to determine whether a stay should be granted. "16
Instead, Judge Easterbrook stated that the court shall "approach the sub-
ject from a different perspective ... asking not whether appellants have
shown a powerful reason why the district court must halt proceedings,
but whether there is any good reason why the district court may carry on
once an appeal has been filed."
'"17
In essence, Judge Easterbrook announced a departure from applying
the four-prong test, and instead rationalized that the district court should
grant a stay in these cases because an appeal divests the district court of
jurisdiction over the matter. He opined, "a federal district court and a
federal court of appeals should not attempt to assert jurisdiction over a
case simultaneously. The filing of a notice of appeal.., confers jurisdic-
tion on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its
control . ,, 118
According to the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, this approach
makes sense and is in line with the purpose of arbitration. First, as Judge
Easterbrook stated in Bradford-Scott, "[c]ontinuation of proceedings in
the district court largely defeats the point of the appeal and creates a risk
of inconsistent handling of the case by two tribunals."' 19 This "inconsis-
tent handling" could lead to the worst and most inefficient outcome: "to
litigate the dispute, to have the court of appeals revise and order the dis-
pute arbitrated, to arbitrate the dispute, and finally return to the court to
have the award enforced."'' 20 An arbitration clause reflects the parties'
112. Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 505.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See supra Part I.C.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)).
119. Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 505.
120. Id. at 506.
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intentions to avoid litigation and opt for non-judicial dispute resolution
that is faster and less expensive.' 2' Potential exposure to the "worst pos-
sible outcome" completely defeats the underlying purposes of arbitra-
tion. 12 2 Allowing for an immediate appeal under Section 16(a) of the
FAA helps to cut duplication losses and maintain the purpose and benefit
of arbitration.
Judge Easterbrook also addressed the reasons why the Second and
Ninth Circuits are incorrect for denying a stay of proceedings during an
appeal of the arbitrability determination. 12 3 The Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits first argue that because arbitrability is completely separate from the
merits of the case, it therefore does not affect any proceedings to resolve
the issue on the merits. 24 Judge Easterbrook responds to this position by
stating, "[a]n appeal authorized by section 16(a)(1)(A) presents the ques-
tion whether the district court must stay its own proceedings pending
arbitration. Whether the litigation may go forward in the district court is
precisely what the court of appeals must decide."1 25 In other words, the
issue on appeal, arbitrability, is directly related to whether the district
court can hear the case, and therefore the proceedings must be stayed.
The second reason the Second and Ninth Circuits refuse to issue
stays is because an automatic stay would allow "crafty" litigants to file
frivolous appeals to disrupt the district court. 26 Judge Easterbrook ad-
mits that this is a serious concern, but a problem easily avoided because
an appellee may ask that the frivolous appeal be dismissed. 127 He stated,
"[e]ither the court of appeals or the district court may declare that the
appeal is frivolous, and if it is the district court may carry on with the
case." 28 The Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit have made suggestions
on how to combat this problem. For example, in Abney v. United
States,129 the Supreme Court stated that policies can be put in place giv-
ing certain appeals expedited treatment as courts of appeals have the
supervisory power "to establish summary procedures and calendars to
weed out frivolous claims.'1
30 Moreover, in United States v. Hines,'
3'
the Tenth Circuit held that a frivolous appeal may be dismissed if the
district court (1) after a hearing and, (2) for substantial reasons given, (3)
found the claim to be frivolous. 32 Furthermore, the Hines court held that









129. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
130. Id. at 662 n.8
131. 689 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1982).
132. Id. at 937.
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divested of jurisdiction."' 33 However, in Apostol v. Gallion,'34 the Tenth
Circuit cautioned that dismissing a motion because it is frivolous is
anomalous, and therefore must be used with restraint.
135
In summary, in contrast to the Second and Ninth Circuits, the Sev-
enth and Eleventh Circuits hold that a district court shall grant a stay of
proceedings pending an arbitrability appeal because during appellate
review, the district court is divested of jurisdiction, and therefore cannot
proceed on the merits. Moreover, although measures can be put in place
to discourage litigants from filing frivolous appeals, it is important that
courts use restraint in making such a dismissal.
II. MCCAULEY V. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SER VICES, INC.
136
A. Facts and Procedural History
Rodney McCauley is a former employee of Halliburton Energy Ser-
vices Inc.137 Mr. McCauley and Halliburton are parties to an agreement
to arbitrate all claims that fall within the scope of Halliburton's Dispute
Resolution Program (DRP).13 8 Mr. McCauley was injured while apply-
ing foam insulation to the exterior of a bulk tank owned by Hallibur-
ton.' 39 Subsequent to his injury, Halliburton decided to terminate Mr.
McCauley. 140
As a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident and Halli-
burton's subsequent action of terminating him, Mr. McCauley sued Hal-
liburton for negligence, fraud and deceit, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and wrongful termination. 41  Additionally, Mr.
McCauley's family brought actions for loss of consortium. 142
The United States District Court for the Western District of Okla-
homa granted Halliburton's motion to arbitrate all claims except the neg-
ligence and consortium claims.143 In denying the motion to arbitrate on
the negligence and consortium claims, the district court held that they
arose from work Mr. McCauley performed as an independent contractor
and outside the scope of his employment. 44 Subsequently, Halliburton
appealed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration as permitted by
the FAA. 14 5 Halliburton then moved the United States Court of Appeals
133. Id.
134. 870 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1989).
135. Id. at 1339.
136. 413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005).
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for the Tenth Circuit to stay proceedings in the district court pending the
arbitrability appeal.1 46 The Tenth Circuit granted Halliburton's motion
and held that the district court was divested of jurisdiction by "Hallibur-
ton's filing of its notice of appeal."'
' 47
B. Tenth Circuit's Rationale in Reaching Its Holding
The Tenth Circuit held that an automatic stay of proceedings shall
be granted pending a non-frivolous appeal the denial of a motion to com-
pel arbitration. 148 The Tenth Circuit's holding mainly hinged on the ar-
gument by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits that an appeal on an arbi-
trability issue divests the district court of jurisdiction, which warrants an
automatic stay. 149  In determining that this approach was sound, the
Tenth Circuit looked to its own precedent addressing divestiture. In
Stewart v. Donges,150 the Tenth Circuit held that a district court was
automatically divested of jurisdiction pending a non-frivolous appeal to
the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immu-
nity.151 In Stewart, the Tenth Circuit stated:
The divestiture of jurisdiction occasioned by the filing of a notice of
appeal is especially significant when the appeal is an interlocutory
one .... The interruption of the trial proceedings is the central reason
and justification for authorizing such an interlocutory appeal in the
first place. When an interlocutory appeal is taken, the district court
[only] retains jurisdiction to proceed with matters not involved in that
appeal. 1
52
Furthermore, the court held that "a finding of frivolousness enabled the
district court to retain jurisdiction and to proceed to trial absent interven-
tion by the court of appeal.'
153
In McCauley, the Tenth Circuit found this line of reasoning persua-
sive for two reasons. First, Section 16(a) appeals are similar to appeals
based on denial of qualified immunity because a failure to grant a stay
pending either type of appeal denies or impairs the appellant's ability to
obtain its "legal entitlement to avoidance of litigation, either constitu-
tional entitlement to qualified immunity or the contractual entitlement to
arbitration."' 54 Second, the Stewart holding is persuasive because it ad-
dresses the possible misuse of interlocutory review by allowing a district
146. Id
147. Id. at 1163.
148. Id. at 1162.
149. Id. at 1160-61.
150. 915 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1990).
151. Stewart, 915 F.2d at 573.
152. Id at 575-76.
153. Id. at 576.
154. McCauley, 413 F.3d at 1162.
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court to deny frivolous appeals and continue absent intervention by the
court of appeals.'
Relying on the divesture principle used by the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits and the previous Tenth Circuit panel in Stewart, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that a non-frivolous appeal to a denied motion to compel arbi-
tration warrants an automatic stay of proceedings. 116
III. ANALYSIS
The following sections will discuss whether the Tenth Circuit's
holding in McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.'57 is in line
with Tenth Circuit precedent; whether the Tenth Circuit's holding is in
line with the purpose of arbitration and the FAA; and finally, the likeli-
hood of the issue reaching the Supreme Court.
A. The Tenth Circuit's Holding and Tenth Circuit Precedent
Although this was a case of first impression in the Tenth Circuit, the
McCauley holding is in line with Tenth Circuit precedent. In addition to
relying on the rationale of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, the Tenth
Circuit relied on past precedent by referencing Stewart v. Donges.'58 In
Stewart, the Tenth Circuit discussed the divesture principle whereby an
interlocutory appeal, such as an arbitrability appeal, divests the district
court of jurisdiction to proceed with the case on the merits.159 Based on
this argument, the Tenth Circuit in McCauley concluded that the district
court does not have jurisdiction to proceed with a case on the merits
pending an arbitrability appeal.160 So, procedurally, granting a stay is the
appropriate course of action based on the divesture principle whereby an
interlocutory appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction to continue
with the case.
B. The Tenth Circuit's Holding and the Purpose ofArbitration
Parties enter into pre-dispute arbitration agreements because arbitra-
tion is an attractive dispute resolution procedure. The attributes of arbi-
tration include: (1) allowing parties to resolve their disputes faster and
with less effort; and (2) fostering a less expensive dispute resolution
process. According to a 2004 study by the National Arbitration Forum,
78% of respondents found faster recovery in arbitration and 59.3% found
arbitration less expensive than litigation.' 6 1 With this established, it be-
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005).
158. 915 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1990).
159. Stewart, 915 F.2d at 575-76.
160. McCauley, 413 F.3d at 1162.
161. NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, supra note 44, at 3.
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comes useful to determine whether a stay of proceedings pending an
arbitrability appeal corresponds with the two purposes of arbitration.
1. Resolving Disputes Faster and With Less Effort
Pending an appeal, the district court may require that the parties
proceed with the case on the merits. If the appellate court determines
that the motion to compel arbitration was properly denied by the district
court then essentially no time and effort was lost by proceeding with the
case on the merits because the parties' would have been ordered to liti-
gate regardless. However, if the appellate court decides that the district
court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration, then proceeding
with the case on the merits is useless. In this scenario, not only have the
parties wasted their time and effort by proceeding with the litigation
process, but the district court has clogged its docket with proceedings
that are essentially nullified by the appellate court's decision. Moreover,
the parties then must arbitrate and possibly submit the issue to the district
court again to have the award enforced. 62 This situation does not pro-
vide for an efficient resolution of the issues-a main purpose of arbitra-
tion. On the other hand, if a stay of proceedings is granted pending the
arbitrability appeal, the district court may continue with other matters
and the parties can avoid wasting the time and effort of proceeding with
a case on the merits that will inevitably be ordered to arbitration.
2. Fostering a Less Expensive System
If the district court does not grant a stay of proceedings, the parties
are required to proceed with the case on the merits. Again, if the appel-
late court determines that the district court properly denied the motion to
compel arbitration then there is no consequence to not staying the pro-
ceedings. However, if the appellate court determines that the district
court erred in not granting the motion to compel arbitration then the par-
ties must incur the expenses of proceeding with the case, the expenses
associated with arbitration, and possibly the expenses of having the dis-
trict court enforce the arbitrator's award. The parties are incurring ex-
penses that would have been avoided had a stay been granted. This is
not in line with the purpose of arbitration-to resolve issues in a manner
that is less expensive than litigation.
Parties generally enter into pre-dispute arbitration agreements be-
cause they find the arbitration process attractive. The approach of the
Tenth Circuit, to grant an automatic stay, allows the parties to avoid the
162. The FAA states:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered
upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any
time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the
court so specified for an order confirming the award ....
9 U.S.C.S. § 9 (2005)
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time, effort, and expenses associated with litigation, which the parties
intended to avoid in the first place by entering into a pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreement.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Holding and Congressional Intent in Enacting the
FAA
It seems logical that courts interpret a statute consistent with Con-
gress' intent when the plain language is unclear. Congress enacted the
FAA so courts would give the same legal effect to arbitration agreements
as is given to other contracts, 163 and to ensure that parties' desire for arbi-
tration would not be undermined by federal and state courts that are un-
willing to enforce arbitration agreements.1 64 In other words, Congress'
intent in enacting the FAA was to encourage the use of arbitration by
making pre-dispute arbitration agreements enforceable. While Congress'
intent is clear, the FAA remains unclear on whether to grant a stay pend-
ing an arbitrability appeal. As a result, it seems appropriate to analyze
the outcome of a district court that grants a stay pending an arbitrability
appeal and a district court that does not grant a stay in an effort to deter-
mine which approach is in line with Congress' intent in enacting the
FAA.
A district court undermines the parties' preference for arbitration by
refusing to grant a stay and ordering the parties to begin the litigation
process. If parties enter into a valid pre-dispute arbitration agreement an
assumption can be made that the parties contracted with the intention of
avoiding litigation. If a district court can order the parties to continue
with the case on merits, regardless of whether an arbitration agreement
exists, it detracts from the legal effect that courts were intended to give
arbitration agreements and discourages the use of arbitration.
In contrast, by granting a stay, a district court is acting in line with
Congress' intent in enacting the FAA. By granting a stay, a district court
is not only acknowledging the fact that an arbitration agreement should
have the same legal effect as other contracts by allowing the parties to
act in a manner consistent with their contracted preference, but also en-
couraging arbitration by not undermining the parties' preference for
avoiding litigation. Granting a stay pending an arbitrability appeal is in
line with the purpose of the FAA.
D. The United States Supreme Court
The criterion for an issue reaching the Supreme Court is stringent,
as the Court grants certiorari in relatively few cases. However, the Court
will often review an issue that is in conflict among the circuits and that is
163. See Stenson, supra note 24, at 661.
164. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (citing Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v.
Terminal Constr. Corp., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961)).
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a legal issue of national importance. 165  Including the Tenth Circuit's
decision in McCauley, only five circuits have addressed the issue of
whether to grant a stay pending an appeal to an arbitrability determina-
tion. With McCauley, three circuits hold that an automatic stay should
be granted and two circuits hold that a stay should not be granted. The
issue is unresolved in five circuits, the D.C. circuit, and the federal cir-
cuit.
The issue will likely reach the Supreme Court in the future. First,
there is a clear conflict among the circuits on this issue as the five cir-
cuits that have addressed the issue are split three-to-two. Following this
pattern, the other circuits will likely be split as well. Second, as indi-
cated by the statistical data,166 arbitration is growing in popularity. As
arbitration becomes more popular, more arbitration agreements will be
created because: "Virtually all American businesses and individuals with
legal capacity to contract ... have entered into agreements that specify
arbitration as the forum for resolving most or all disputes that might arise
between the parties."'
167
Arbitration is impacting businesses and individuals alike - increas-
ingly receiving attention not only in the lower courts but in the Supreme
Court as well. For example, the Supreme Court "has decided more than
thirty arbitration cases since 1983, including ten since the turn of the
century."'168 Therefore, a strong presumption can be made that issues
dealing with arbitration are matters of national importance, and accord-
ingly, there is a strong likelihood that the particular issue addressed in
this article and perhaps many others dealing with arbitration will face
review by the Supreme Court in the future.
In the event that the issues discussed in this article reaches the Su-
preme Court, there is a strong likelihood that the Supreme Court will
adopt the Tenth Circuit's approach-in line with the purpose of arbitra-
tion and Congress' intent in enacting the FAA. Furthermore, the oppos-
ing view, refusing to grant a stay, relies heavily on the fact that it dis-
courages litigants from bringing frivolous appeals. However, there are
measures in place for combating this problem, and therefore the oppos-
ing view's argument is substantially discredited. 
169
165. See Richard J. Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 201, 216
(2004).
166. See supra Part I.D.
167. Stephen K. Huber, The Arbitration Jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit, 35 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 497, 498 (2004).
168. Id. at 499.
169. See supra Part 1.F.
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CONCLUSION
In McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Services Inc.,' 70 the Tenth Cir-
cuit adopted the reasoning of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits and held
that a non-frivolous appeal of a denied motion to compel arbitration war-
rants issuance of an automatic stay of proceedings. This is the correct
approach for several reasons. First, an appeal divests the district court of
jurisdiction over a matter. If the district court does not have jurisdiction
over the matter then the district court should not be able to proceed with
the case on the merits. Second, a main argument for not granting a stay
of proceedings is that it prevents frivolous appeals. However, the Tenth
Circuit has addressed this concern by adopting a procedure by which the
district court can deny the appeal as frivolous.
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit's approach corresponds to the purposes
of arbitration. Generally, a party's decision to enter a pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreement reflects their desire for arbitration. By granting a stay,
the parties avoid the time, effort, and expenses associated with litigation,
and the district court may proceed with other matters while the appellate
court handles the arbitrability issue. Furthermore, based on Congress'
intent in enacting the FAA, granting a stay is appropriate. By doing so,
the district court gives full effect to the parties' contracted preference for
avoiding litigation.
Although the approach of the Tenth Circuit appears to be correct,
there is nevertheless a circuit split. As more circuits confront this issue,
the split may become more prominent, and when there is a conflict
among the circuits on an issue of national importance, such as the issue
here, it is likely the issue will reach the Supreme Court. Arbitration is
growing in popularity and increasingly making its way into the American
legal system, and as a result, the circuits and possibly the Supreme Court
will continue to face important issues pertaining to alternative dispute
resolutions procedures such as arbitration.
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